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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-4604 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
  
CALVIN PLUMMER, a/k/a FORTY 
 
              Appellant  
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 08-cr-00376-021) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 16, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Calvin Plummer appeals the sentence imposed for his violation of supervised 
release.  Because the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will 
affirm. 
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I 
 
 As we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  Plummer pleaded guilty to possession with intent to 
distribute and distribution of cocaine and cocaine base, and was sentenced to 46 months 
of imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised release.  Among other conditions of 
supervised release, Plummer was required to refrain from unlawfully using a controlled 
substance, refrain from committing another crime, participate in drug testing and 
treatment, and notify his probation officer within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned 
by a law enforcement officer.   
 While Plummer was on supervised release, the United States Probation Office 
filed a Petition alleging that Plummer: (1) tested positive for marijuana ten times; (2) was 
arrested for driving under the influence; (3) failed to notify his probation officer of the 
arrest within 72 hours; (4) failed to appear for substance abuse testing six times; and (5) 
failed to attend a weekly session of the Probation Office’s Intermediate Sanction 
Program.   
 On November 4, 2013, the District Court held a hearing at which Plummer 
admitted to these violations and to additional violations for failing to inform his probation 
officer of several traffic citations.  To avoid revocation of his supervised release, 
Plummer asked that the hearing be continued so that he could come into compliance with 
his supervised release conditions by clearing his outstanding warrants, attending drug 
treatment, beginning full-time employment, and refraining from further drug use.  The 
District Court granted Plummer’s request and adjourned the hearing until November 19, 
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2013.  The District Court cautioned Plummer that if he used drugs or failed to attend drug 
treatment, therapy, or the Probation Office’s Intermediate Sanction Program, he would 
“go right to jail.”  App. 41, 57-58, 65.   
 At the continued hearing on November 19, the District Court learned that 
Plummer had not complied with the District Court’s directives and had committed 
additional violations.  Specifically, Plummer used marijuana, failed to clear any of his 
outstanding warrants, and missed a required Intermediate Sanction Program session.  The 
District Court reminded Plummer that his conduct constituted Class C violations and his 
Category III criminal history resulted in an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 5 to 
11 months’ imprisonment.  The parties then presented sentencing arguments and 
Plummer spoke on his own behalf.  Plummer and his counsel both attempted to dissuade 
the District Court from re-incarcerating him, and instead asked it to permit him to 
continue working so that he could earn enough money to clear his outstanding warrants. 
The District Court revoked Plummer’s supervised release and sentenced him to 6 
months of incarceration and 24 months of supervised release, with the first 6 months of 
supervised release to be served in a community confinement center.  In explaining the 
sentence, the District Court discussed Plummer’s repeated violations, the opportunity it 
had given Plummer to address those violations, Plummer’s personal history and 
characteristics, and the need for a sentence to deter future criminal activity and protect 
the public.  The District Court also expressed concern for Plummer’s substance abuse and 
advised him to seek additional treatment both during incarceration and upon release.  
Although Plummer sought house arrest in lieu of incarceration, he did not assert that the 
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imposition of community confinement in addition to prison unlawfully exceeded the 
advisory Guidelines range.  Plummer appeals.   
II
1
 
 
 Plummer challenges both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his 
sentence.  We typically review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a 
sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496, 500 (3d Cir. 2013).  Where a defendant fails to raise a 
specific objection to his sentence before the district court, however, we review for plain 
error.  United States v. Jones, 740 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2014).  Plain error review 
requires us to determine whether the District Court erred, the error was “plain,” and the 
error affected “substantial rights.”  United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 70 (3d Cir. 
2008).  If an appellant meets all three requirements, then we may exercise our discretion 
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) to consider the error, but only if the error “seriously affects 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).       
III 
 Plummer challenges his sentence on three grounds.  He contends that the District 
Court: (1) erred by sentencing him to “twelve months of confinement” in violation of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §§ 7B1.3(c) and 7B1.4; (2) failed to meaningfully consider 
the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or adequately discuss them in relation to his 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction over Plummer’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).   
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sentence; and (3) imposed a sentence that was both excessive and greater than necessary 
to achieve the goals of sentencing.   
A 
 We first address Plummer’s claim that the District Court’s sentence violated 
Guidelines §§ 7B1.3(c) and 7B1.4.  Plummer’s Class C violations exposed him to a 
revocation sentence of 5 to 11 months’ imprisonment.  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4.  Because the 
minimum term of imprisonment is between 1 month and 6 months, “the minimum term 
may be satisfied by (A) a sentence of imprisonment; or (B) a sentence of imprisonment 
that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that substitutes community 
confinement or home detention according to the schedule in § 5C1.1(e) for any portion of 
the minimum term.”  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(c)(1).  Plummer argues that the combination of 6 
months’ imprisonment and 6 months’ community confinement amounts to 12 months of 
confinement in violation of these sections. 
Because Plummer did not raise this argument before the District Court, he must 
show that the sentence was plain error.  Plummer cannot do so as community 
confinement does not constitute imprisonment.  Imprisonment and community 
confinement are different because imprisonment removes a person from the community 
while community confinement restricts a person within the community.  United States v. 
Adler, 52 F.3d 20, 21 (2d Cir. 1995).  Additionally, the Sentencing Guidelines view 
community confinement and imprisonment as distinct.  For instance, our Court has 
explained that community confinement “cannot constitute imprisonment” that fulfills 
§ 5C1.1’s requirement that at least part of a split sentence “be satisfied by imprisonment.”  
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United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 777-78 (3d Cir. 2000).
2
  Because community 
confinement as a condition of supervised release is not an additional term of 
imprisonment, Plummer’s challenge fails.  See also United States v. Elkins, 176 F.3d 
1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Horek, 137 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(“[C]ommunity confinement, as a condition of probation, is not ‘imprisonment’ within 
the meaning of the Guidelines and, therefore, should not be credited against either the 
sentence imposed on revocation of probation or the maximum guideline term.”). 
For these reasons, the District Court did not err in sentencing Plummer to 6 
months of incarceration and 24 months of supervised release with the first 6 months in 
community confinement.   
                                              
2
 In Serafini, this Court stated in dicta that the district court would have committed 
reversible error had it ordered community confinement to satisfy “the requirement for 
imprisonment.”  Serafini, 233 F.3d at 777-78; see also Adler, 52 F.3d at 21 
(imprisonment and community confinement “are not synonyms” for purposes of 
minimum sentence under § 5C2.1(d)); United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 713 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (the “Sentencing Commission considered a sentence to confinement in a 
community treatment center to be different from a ‘sentence of imprisonment’” under 
§ 5C1.1(d)); United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (9th Cir 1993) (reviewing 
“numerous provisions of the Guidelines” and concluding that the Sentencing Commission 
“repeatedly draws a sharp distinction between confinement in a community treatment 
center or halfway house and confinement in a conventional prison facility”).       
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B 
 Plummer next argues that the District Court imposed a procedurally unreasonable 
sentence by failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors or “discuss these factors in context 
or relation to the sentence imposed.”  Appellant’s Br. 13.3  To be procedurally 
reasonable, a revocation sentence must, among other things, reflect “rational and 
meaningful consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors.”4  United States v. Clark, 726 
F.3d 496, 500 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).  A district court is “not required 
to comment explicitly on every [sentencing] factor,” United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 
128, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted), or “make explicit 
findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear that [it] took the 
facts into account in sentencing.”  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
                                              
3
 Because Plummer was sentenced prior to our decision in United States v. Flores-
Mejia, No. 12-3149, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 3450938 (3d Cir. July 16, 2014) (en banc), we 
will review this issue for abuse of discretion despite his apparent failure to explicitly raise 
his procedural objection after the District Court announced his sentence.  See Flores-
Mejia, 2014 WL 3450938, at *4 & n.7 (clarifying that a defendant’s “duty to object to [a] 
sentencing court’s procedural error after sentencing” does not apply retroactively).   
 
4
 Section 3583(e) permits a district court to revoke or modify the conditions of 
supervised release upon consideration of the following § 3553(a) factors: (a)(1) (the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant); (a)(2)(B) (the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct); (a)(2)(C) (the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant); (a)(2)(D) (the need for the sentence imposed to provide 
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner); (a)(4) (the applicable Guidelines or 
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(3)); (a)(5) (the Guidelines or policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)); (a)(6) (the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
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 The record demonstrates that the District Court gave meaningful consideration to 
the applicable § 3553(a) factors and adequately explained its chosen sentence.  The 
District Court acknowledged the multiple violations to which Plummer admitted and 
noted that he was given a chance to rectify his violations before sentencing, yet he 
continued to violate the conditions of his supervised release.  It then considered the need 
to impose a sentence sufficient to deter future criminal conduct generally, the need to 
protect the public from Plummer specifically, and Plummer’s need for treatment.  In this 
regard, the District Court expressed concern about Plummer’s continued marijuana abuse, 
and conveyed its desire that he seek treatment during his 6-month incarceration, and 
implored him to save money to clear his outstanding warrants upon release.   
Because the District Court meaningfully considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors 
and explained its chosen sentence, the sentence was procedurally reasonable.    
C 
 Having found Plummer’s sentence procedurally reasonable, we next address his 
assertion that his sentence was excessive and greater than necessary to achieve the goals 
of sentencing, and therefore substantively unreasonable.   
We will affirm a procedurally sound sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 
the district court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(en banc).  Thus, our review of substantive reasonableness is highly deferential and 
                                                                                                                                                  
found guilty of similar conduct); and (a)(7) (the need to provide restitution to any victims 
of the offense).  18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e), 3553(a). 
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focuses on “whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible 
statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the 
relevant factors.”  Clark, 726 F.3d at 500 (quoting United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 
770 (3d Cir. 2010)).  In reviewing a sentence for violation of supervised release, we are 
mindful that its primary purpose is “to sanction the defendant’s breach of trust” while 
accounting for “the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the 
violator.”  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks 
omitted); see also United States v. Thornhill, No. 13-2876, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 
3056536, at *12 (3d Cir. July 8, 2014) (noting that a defendant’s “recidivism” and 
violation of mandatory supervised release conditions come “to the forefront” of a 
revocation hearing).   
 Here, we cannot conclude that Plummer’s sentence is unreasonable.  In 
determining the sentence, the District Court considered Plummer’s repeated violations of 
his supervised released conditions and his failure to take advantage of the opportunity the 
District Court provided to rectify them.  It also discussed his personal characteristics, his 
drug use, and its conclusion that a custodial sentence together with a period of 
supervision was necessary to address his need for treatment and the goal of deterring him 
from future violations.  For these reasons, Plummer’s sentence is substantively 
reasonable. 
IV 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
